Introduction
Historically, the primary players in e-commerce have been large businesses attempting to reach a large, geographically dispersed audience through the expansive reach provided by the Internet. Small, boutique firms providing what we term presence goods or services, which require that the consumer be physically present in a particular location or service area to consume the good or service, did not typically engage in commerce online. Intuitively, this is because these firms serve a small, specific geographic area, and the investment required to have an online presence was too high relative to the expected benefit. Recently, many services and platforms have emerged which enable these firms to have a more active engagement with customers over the Internet. Targeted search advertising based on region and other demographics; daily deal sites offering local deals, such as Groupon and LivingSocial; and emerging location-aware mobile "push" advertising are all examples of technologies which provide opportunities for these small, boutique firms to reach customers online.
As these firms develop their online presence, it is interesting to consider the resulting impact on local competition among vendors offering similar goods or services within the same area. While some have argued that the Internet has made distance irrelevant, it does not seem that this should hold for these small businesses. Because they provide presence goods or services requiring customers to be physically present for consumption, physical transportation costs will remain an important factor for consumers in choosing a particular vendor from which they will purchase. Advertising or selling through the Internet may increase awareness of a vendor outside its local geographic area, but due to transportation costs, few of the distant customers reached in this way will actually purchase from the vendor. The primary effect will be on customers within a local service area of the vendor.
We examine how utilization of a direct online sales channel by local vendors selling presence goods or services affects local competition. While the presence goods or services may be purchased online, they must be consumed in a particular location. Therefore, transportation costs are still an important factor, with the primary effect of the online channel being a reduction in search costs. We expect that as vendors within a local geographic area engage with customers over the Internet, this will increase competition in a local service area surrounding these vendors, but not in distant areas. Other vendors in the same area and providing similar products or services will respond by also taking steps to engage with customers over the Internet, so as to remain competitive, but the effect will be contained to the local area. We further expect that the local competition for a presence good and services will be moderated by the extent of differentiation in such products offerings. In order to examine this issue, we utilize data from Groupon, a popular provider of daily deals -vouchers which can be purchased at a deep discount and redeemed at local vendors for goods or services such as restaurants, spas, auto mechanics, and entertainment venues. Combining this with data from Google Maps, UrbanSpoon, and Flickr, we show that competition increases in the local area surrounding a vendor when that vendor enters the electronic market. This effect diminishes with distance, and is moderated by the level of horizontal and vertical differentiation among vendors in the local area.
Our present work makes several contributions to the existing literature on the impact of the Internet on competition. First, we empirically examine the effect of the Internet on local competition among vendors selling presence goods or services, distinct from previously studied effects of the Internet on competition in physical or electronic goods markets. In this work we empirically validate analytical results from Bakos (1997) regarding how the Internet affects competition, but in a setting in which transportation costs play a significant role. Second, our study examines competition between small, boutique vendors, which typically may not be studied in such a large scale, due to issues in collecting data for a large number of small firms. We are not aware of any other studies that examine such firms using objective economic data. Small businesses comprise 46% of private-sector output, and 48.5% of private-sector employment (U.S. Small Business Association 2014), and research on such a large and unstudied segment of the economy is valuable. Third, we provide empirical evidence of the moderating role of vertical and horizontal differentiation on competition among firms in a local geographic area. Fourth, we provide a novel approach for analyzing competition in a geographic area using a variety of publicly available datasets. Our approach of identifying the clusters of a vendor type in a geographic area using publicly available Flickr and Google Maps datasets can be used in future studies to examine the effect of a variety of factors on local competition.
Theory
Geographic competition in its simplest form is epitomized by the Hotelling model, in which customers experience different transportation costs in purchasing from competing firms (Hotelling 1929) . Transportation costs, which may represent distance or other preferences, form the basis of consumer choice, given that consumers are aware of all vendors, prices, and qualities. This, however, may not be the case, and consumers must incur search costs to determine which vendor is the best fit. Hence, consumers face a trade-off between transportation costs (lack of fit) and search costs. A feature of the Internet is that it serves to lower search costs (Bakos 1997) . If vendors can transport their goods or services directly to consumers, transportation costs are reduced as well. With reduced search and transportation costs and a large number of firms competing, competition may become intense due to the impact of the Internet, leading to low price dispersion and profits (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) .
Several studies empirically examine effects on competition from interplay of the Internet and geographic location. Blum and Goldfarb (2006) show that even if digital goods are available from vendors in various locations, consumers tend to transact with vendors who are closer to them. Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2009) and Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Rahman (2009) examine the competition between online and brick-and-mortar retailers, finding that physical retailers in an area diminish online demand. Granados, Gupta, and Kauffman (2012) study differences in price elasticity in online and offline channels for air travel, finding online channels more elastic. Pozzi (2013) examines the impact of supermarkets introducing online channels which reduce transportation costs for consumers, showing that this allows capture of additional market share with little cannibalization (p. 580).
These empirical investigations all share several common characteristics. First, they focus on the ability of the Internet and online channels to reduce transportation costs. Search costs may also be considered, but transportation costs play a large role. Second, they examine commodity goods that are virtually identical across the online and offline vendors from which consumers choose to purchase. Third, the literature has largely focused on the interplay between brick-and-mortar and online retailers, typically not the introduction of an online channel to a traditionally brick-and-mortar vendor. Of the studies we mention above, only Pozzi (2013) studies the introduction of an online channel for an existing brick-and-mortar vendor, but still focuses on transportation costs and commodity goods. In contrast to existing empirical work in this area, we focus on brick-and-mortar vendors selling differentiated products. We examine the impact on competition created when certain of these vendors also sell goods or services through online channels. However, while the sale occurs online, the good or service still must be consumed at the vendor's physical location, so transportation costs are unaffected. The benefit of the online channel is predominantly related to consumer search costs.
In this way, we provide empirical evidence for analytical results regarding search costs (Bakos 1997) and transportation costs (Hotelling 1929) . Bakos shows that when customers' costs of acquiring product information is high, as in our case, introduction of electronic markets will create pressure for sellers to increase discounts. The first seller to enter an electronic market will do so to capture buyer surplus, but this will increase competition in a prisoners' dilemma, with other sellers also entering and increasing discounts. Based on this, we propose that when a seller offers a daily deal through Groupon (the electronic market), other sellers will respond in kind, following on by joining Groupon and offering further discounts. But based on the nature of these vendors, who sell presence goods and services, transportation costs will confine the competition to a local area. Within a certain area, the response of competing vendors will be strong, but the effect will dissipate as distance increases.
Beyond this, we investigate the moderating effect of differentiation among vendors on competition spurred by Groupon. As mentioned, in Hotelling's model, transportation costs may represent any dimension upon which preferences differ (Hotelling 1929) . Further, Shaked and Sutton (1982) demonstrate that differentiation among vendors reduces price competition. Based on these works, we expect that local geographic areas with higher levels of vertical and horizontal differentiation will be less impacted by the competitive effects of vendors entering the Groupon electronic market.
Data
We collected data on daily deals served by Groupon. Consumers subscribe to local daily deal emails provided by Groupon, which are distributed on a daily basis advertising available vouchers which may be purchased through the Groupon website. Vouchers typically sell for a 50% discount relative to retail value. Groupon and the vendor split the revenues collected from the sale of vouchers. Customers redeem purchased vouchers at the vendors' premises as if they were gift cards. This model allows brick-and-mortar vendors to sell their presence goods and services through an online channel.
For our analysis, we collected daily deals offered through Groupon over a 17 month period (7/1/2011-11/30/2012). We collected data for approximately 110,000 deals offered from vendors in all 187 Groupon locations (called divisions) in North America. To examine the effects of the Internet on vendors of presence goods or services, we concentrate on only two types of deals: restaurant and spa/personal care. These two types of deals comprise approximately 40% of all daily deals offered by Groupon and they unambiguously represent presence goods or services that require customers to be physically present on vendors' premises or in a local service area for consumption. Finally, we randomly selected 60 divisions for the collection of remaining data required for our analysis.
To examine the impact of daily deals on localized competition, we require a knowledge of the geographic distribution of vendors relative to those vendors offering daily deals. The first step in this process is to identify the area which Groupon serves in each division. One option would be to define bounds to include all deals offered for that division. However, Groupon occasionally offers deals in a division that are redeemable at a faraway location (e.g. a deal offered in Atlanta division but redeemable in New York), thus division boundaries cannot be determined in this way. Other defined boundaries such as official city or metropolitan area bounds are unsatisfactory as well. What is required is a definition of what a consumer would naturally consider the boundaries of a division. For this, we turn to a project undertaken by Flickr called Shapefiles. Millions of users upload photos to Flickr on a daily basis, tagged with meta-data including latitude, longitude, and user-input location. Flickr processed this meta-data to determine natural definitions for "regions" including cities and other areas representing Groupon divisions. After examining the boundaries for reasonableness, we adopt these definitions for our division boundaries. We drop all deals offered in a division with redemption location outside this boundary, as they are irrelevant to local competition.
With division boundaries in hand, we utilize the Google Maps API to collect information about the spatial distribution of vendors within a division. We use search terms "restaurant" for restaurant-type vendors, and "spa" and "massage" for spa-type vendors, and collect the locations of all vendors of these types using a fine grid search within the boundaries of each division. The purpose of collecting these vendors is to determine the various local service areas in which consumers choose between vendors. Intuitively, based on transportation costs, consumers will typically limit their choice of restaurant or spa vendor to those in a specific area in a division that is nearby, rather than considering the entire division. While customers may occasionally travel across a division for a deal, largely competition for customers will be concentrated among vendors in specific localized areas.
To identify these areas, we use an unsupervised agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm with Ward's linkage method to classify all vendors of a type into groups based on geographic proximity. Distance is measured in the Euclidean sense using latitudes and longitudes for each vendor, with coordinates adjusted using great-circle distance calculations to account for the Earth's curvature. Each cluster represents a consumer's typical choice set of vendors based on transportation costs. After testing several cluster sizes for reasonableness, we required a minimum of four clusters for each division, plus additional clusters based on the log of the number of vendors. We tested other possibilities and found our results to be robust to other reasonable choices for cluster size.
To measure the moderating effects of vertical and horizontal differentiation on the impact of the Internet on local competition, we collect data regarding the types of cuisine and relative prices for restaurants in each division from UrbanSpoon.com. Based on location, we assign each listing to a cluster created from the Google Maps data. For each cluster, we measure horizontal differentiation based on the distribution of restaurants across the 111 cuisine types assigned by UrbanSpoon. We measure this distribution using the Herfindahl index, which measures market concentration. We group vendors by cuisine type and measure market share of the cuisine type as the proportion of vendors offering that cuisine type in a particular cluster. Formally,
where is the set of all possible cuisine types, and the number of vendors of cuisine type in cluster . This measure will be higher in clusters with a higher concentration of certain cuisine types signifying lower horizontal differentiation and more intense competition. Therefore, we expect that a higher Herfindahl index for a cluster will lead to a more intense effect of the Internet on local competition.
To represent vertical differentiation, we use the price dispersion among vendors in a cluster, specifically the coefficient of variation (COV) of the prices (measured on a discreet four-point scale) for vendors in the cluster, ⁄ . The higher the coefficient of variation, the higher dispersion of prices, and less intense the competition. Therefore we expect that a lower coefficient of variation for a cluster will lead to more intense effect of the Internet on local competition.
Model and Results
We use specification (1) to examine the effect of prior period deals both inside and outside a competitive cluster on those in the current period after controlling for other observed and unobserved factors that may influence the number of deals offered:
where ∈ {1, 2} denotes the deal category (i.e. restaurant or spa), ∈ {1, 2, … , 60} denotes the division, ∈ {1, 2, … , } denotes the cluster identified for deal category in division , and ∈ {1, 2, … , 17} denotes the month.
denotes the number of deals offered in category , division , and cluster in period .
(− ) denotes the number of deals offered in category and division for all clusters other than in period . includes controls (− ) and (− ) . denotes combined category-division-cluster fixed effects and a vector of dummy variables indicating the month -note these are omitted for brevity in results presented below.
The primary coefficient of interest 1 represents the effect of prior period deals in a category, division, and cluster on the number of deals offered in that same category, division, and cluster in the current period. A positive effect on this variable indicates that deals offered by vendors increase competition in a local area around the vendors. Coefficient 2 , on the other hand, represents the effect of prior period deals offered in a category in all other clusters of the division on the deals offered in the same category in a particular cluster in the current period. If the Internet promotes localized competition, we should find a higher and more significant value for coefficient δ1 as compared to δ2.
The results of model (1) are presented in Table 1 for both restaurant-and spa-type vendors. For spas, we find a positive and significant estimate of coefficient δ1 but an insignificant estimate for coefficient δ2, which indicates that the number of spa deals in a cluster in a division is positively correlated to the number of spa deals in that cluster in previous period but uncorrelated with the number of spa deals in all other clusters in that division in previous period. Thus as spa vendors join the Groupon platform and offer deals, competition is increased in the local service area to which the vendor belongs. Other spa vendors in the service area respond by also joining Groupon and offering discounted daily deal vouchers of their own. However, while spa vendors offering daily deals online increases competition in a local service area, the competitive impact is restricted to this local area.
For restaurant-type vendors, we do not find the same competitive effect. There is no significant relationship between prior period and current period Groupon restaurant deals in a cluster. One reason for this discrepancy may be competitive differences, specifically, how spas and restaurants are differentiated. Restaurants can be highly differentiated, both vertically (e.g. fast food versus white table) and horizontally (burgers versus seafood). Based on the UrbanSpoon data collected, we calculated the Herfindahl index for cuisine types in clusters of restaurant vendors, finding the mean to be 0.08, a very low index indicating significant horizontal differentiation. Likewise, the mean coefficient of variation for restaurant pricing within clusters is 0.44, indicating significant vertical differentiation. Based on these measures, it may be that restaurants operate in a less directly competitive environment than spas, which are less differentiated. To determine if differentiation is the cause of the lack of effect on restaurant competition, we split our data into high and low differentiation clusters based on cuisine type Herfindahl index of each cluster for horizontal differentiation, and coefficient of variation of prices for vertical differentiation. All clusters with higher (lower) than median differentiation are classified as high (low) differentiation clusters. For each set of clusters, we apply model (1). Results for by level of differentiation are provided in Table 2 . For both horizontal and vertical measures, in clusters with low differentiation and a more competitive environment, we find a significant positive relationship between prior and current period daily deal offerings. However, for clusters with high differentiation, we find negative or no relationships. This supports the proposition that both vertical and horizontal differentiation mediate the effects of electronic marketplaces on local competition among presence good and service vendors. Those areas with lower (higher) differentiation are affected more (less).
Conclusion
As large numbers of small, local, boutique firms begin to engage in electronic markets, it has become important to study the effects of this online engagement of customers on local competition. Previous studies empirically investigating the effects of the Internet on local competition have focused on large online firms competing against local vendors in markets selling commodity goods. Instead, we examine only small, local firms selling presence goods which elect to add sales through an electronic market to their brick-and-mortar business. We find that for these types of firms, entrance into electronic markets intensifies competition at a local scale, but this effect diminishes with distance. Further, the effect on competition is moderated by the amount of horizontal and vertical differentiation among firms within a local service area, with areas having lower differentiation experiencing a higher impact on competition.
Our findings validate analytical studies such as Bakos (1997) , which demonstrate that when information on product qualities is difficult to obtain, the introduction of electronic markets will increase competition in the form of price discounts. We validate these findings specifically in a setting in which transportation costs play a significant role. Additionally, our findings have implications for small firms selling presence goods, as well as electronic market platforms serving these firms. Firms considering entering an electronic market should consider the competitive environment in which they operate and anticipate response from competing firms in their local service area. Platforms serving these firms may focus sales efforts in less differentiated service locations as deals offered in these areas will spur the most competitive response, driving subsequent demand for daily deal services.
